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10 Science and Implementation 
Mary Ruckelshaus and Donna Darm 
The U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) relies heavily on science, and not sur-
prisingly science has become a major battleground in the controversy surround-
ing its implementation (Doremus, this volume). Apparently, Congress hoped 
that ESA decisions could be made based on science alone and thereby insulated 
from politics (U.S. Congress 1982, 19). This hope was unrealistic for at least 
two reasons. First, science cannot answer with certainty many of the questions 
that must be answered in ESA decision making, especially in the time frames 
demanded by the statute. Second, while science has a central role in informing 
natural resource decisions, scientific information alone cannot "make deci-
sions." Criticizing the science seems to be one outcome of hard policy choices 
(Mapes 2001; Boyle 2002; Dalton 2002; Seattle Times 2002; Stokstad 2002; 
Strassel 2002; Pianin 2003; Sacramento Bee 2003a and 2003b; Cart and Weiss 
2004). 
The ESA requires agency reliance on science in several areas: The secretaries 
of commerce and the interior must designate critical habitat based on the best 
available scientific data (ESA sec. 4(b)(2)); federal agencies must rely on the best 
available scientific and commercial data but ensure that their actions will not 
jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or adversely modifY their 
critical habitat (ESA sec. 7(a)(2)); and recovery plans must adopt objective cri-
teria for delisting (ESA sec. 4(f)(1)(B)(ii)). In requiring that decisions affecting 
endangered species be made primarily on the basis of science, Congress sought 
to insulate agencies from political pressure. Instead, perversely, intense political 
pressure has forced underground the agency policy choices inherent in science-
based decisions (Doremus 1997). 
Some scholars have argued that "better science" will not reduce the contro-
versy surrounding the act. Instead, they call for more openness about the policy 
choices embedded in ESA decisions (Doremus 1997; Myer 2001; Yaffee 2006). 
The authors wholeheartedly agree, but we also believe that better scientific in-
formation and processes of eliciting and translating science can improve deci-
sion making under the act. 
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The ESA has been the subject of intense debate in the scientific literature in 
terms of its effectiveness in protecting species (Schwartz 1999; Boersma et al. 
200 1; Crouse et al. 2002; Scott et al. 2006, chap. 2). Federal agency use of sci-
entific information in implementing the act was evaluated by the National Re-
search Council (1995). In this chapter, we focus on the role of science in the act 
and how the agencies use science in practice. We address the following ques-
tions for each stage of the ESA process from listing through recovery planning: 
(1) What is the role of science, and what has agency practice revealed to be the 
difficulties of incorporating science? (2) How have the public and courts re-
sponded? (3) How could either the science or the process of providing science 
be improved? We also consider whether decision makers are prepared to make 
and explain decisions based on incomplete science. We close with suggestions 
for how scientists can better serve decision making under the act. 
The Science Underlying Listing Determinations 
Two biological questions are central to the listing process: What is the species 
(or biological unit) to be listed? And what is the species' likely risk of extinction? 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) have developed interagency guidance on how to manage list-
ing petitions (USFWS and NMFS 1996d, 1999d) but that guidance does not 
offer biological criteria to address the issues below. 
What is a Listable Unit? 
The Endangered Species Act protects "subspecies and any distinct population 
segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when ma-
ture" (sec. 3(15)). Four difficult science issues have emerged in practice: Do all 
subspecies have equivalent "significance" taxonomically? What is a distinct pop-
ulation segment (Waples, this volume)? How does hybridization between taxa 
affect species identification (Haig and Allendorf, this volume)? How should ar-
tificially propagated individuals be considered? 
SPECIES AND SUBSPECIES 
The accuracy and degree of revisions of taxonomic classifications at the sub-
species level vary greatly among species. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has 
frequently encountered situations in which it was uncertain whether a group of 
individuals should be classified as a distinct population segment, a subspecies, 
or even a separate species (e.g., interior least tern [USFWS 1985], lower Keys 
rice rat [USFWS 1991a], Mississippi gopher frog [Rana capito sevosa] , Califor-
nia red-legged frog [Rana aurora dray to nit] [USFWS 1996a], and California 
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tiger salamander [Ambystoma californiensel [USFWS 2003c]). The listing deter_ 
minations for the coastal California gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica califor_ 
nica) (USFWS 1993), dusky seaside sparrow (Ammodramus maritimus ni-
grescens) (Avise and Nelson 1989), and Florida panther (Puma concolor coryz) 
(Culver et al. 2000) aroused enormous controversy over the issue of whether the 
groups were significantly divergent from more common sister taxa to be consid_ 
ered subspecies and therefore listable units. The social and political fallout frorn 
these listing decisions continues today (e.g., Carlson 2003; Miami Herald2003. 
, 
PFeifer 2003; Wilson 2003a). In some respects the controversy is misplaced be-
cause even if not considered subspecies, many of these population groups can be 
listed as distinct population segments (Stanford Environmental Law Society 
2001). In other cases, new information about the lack of reproductive isolation 
may lead USFWS and NMFS biologists to conclude that a group of popula-
tions is neither a subspecies (contrary to a published classification) nor a distinct 
population segment, as in the case of the western sage grouse (USFWS 2004a). 
DISTINCT POPULATION SEGMENT 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service have 
a joint distinct population segment (DPS) policy (USFWS and NMFS 1996e) 
that provides two tests of distinctness: (1) Is the population or group of popula-
tions markedly separate from other populations of the same species? (2) Is it sig-
nificant? NMFS adopted a policy for designating distinct population segments 
of Pacific salmon and steelhead (NMFS 1991; Waples 1991, 1995), which re-
lies on identification of evolutionarily significant units (ESUs) before the joint 
DPS policy was implemented (Waples, this volume). In delineating a DPS, 
agencies must establish the significance of intraspecific variation in life history, 
genetic, or morphological traits. It is important to determine the relationship of 
life history variants (e.g., races) to one another in order to decide into how 
many pieces a species could or should be divided for listing determinations 
(Waples, this volume). 
The coastal California gnatcatcher illustrates the difficulty in determining 
the significance of within-species variation. The birds were originally identified 
as a subspecies based on bill size and shape, tail length, and overall coloration-
all characteristics used by ornithologists to establish taxonomic classifications 
(USFWS 1993). These characteristics evolved since the last ice age, when the 
birds expanded northward from a refuge in Mexico-evolutionarily a very short 
time frame. Skeptical of the listing, private-sector interests sponsored research 
suggesting morphological variations may not be genetically based. In response, 
the USFWS proposed listing the coastal California gnatcatcher as a distinct 
population segment (USFWS 2003a). As a practical matter, in spite of a rash of 
new scientific information gathering and analyses, the listing of the gnatcatcher 
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as a DrS rather than a subspecies has had little, if any, effect on the degree of 
protection it is afforded under the Endangered Species Act. 
How important is intraspecific variation to long-term persistence of the sub-
species or species? Should relatively recently evolved forms be protected? Some 
observers (and plaintiffs) argue that the act is meant to protect morphologically 
unique forms as "distinct" population segments (Doremus 1997). Others sug-
aest that the relevant inquiry should be whether, if lost, the variation could 
~volve again in a time span meaningful to humans (such as a few generations) 
(Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b; Waples et al. 2004). 
Once a distinct population segment is delineated, scientists must assess the 
importance of different morphological or life history forms to the continued ex-
istence of the Drs (or species or subspecies) as a whole. 
HYBRIDS 
Hybridization between closely related taxa can create listing challenges, espe-
cially when one of the hybridizing species is common and the other rare (Haig 
and Allendorf, this volume). For example, the red wolf (Canis lupus rufus), 
which is listed as endangered under the ESA, may interbreed with the unlisted 
eastern gray wolf ( Canis lupus lycaon) (Wayne and Jenks 1991; Dowling et al. 
1992; Nowak 1992; Brownlow 1996). An equally vexing example is the west-
slope cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki lewisz), which hybridizes with intro-
duced rainbow trout (0. mykiss) in the western United States (Allendorf and 
Leary 1988; Behnke 1992; Rubidge et al. 2001; Rubidge 2003; Taylor et al. 
2003). In that case, after legal challenge and extensive discussion, the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service decided not to list the trout despite a proposed policy on 
considering hybrids (or intercrosses) under the act (USFWS and NMFS 1996£; 
USFWS 2003f). 
ARTIFICIAL PROPAGATION 
Both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice have had to consider artificially propagated individuals occurring in natural 
habitats (e.g., fish produced in a hatchery, captively bred birds). Until recently, 
both agencies judged the danger of extinction and the state of recovery based on 
naturally reproducing populations. NMFS has proposed a policy that considers 
the risk of extinction of species based on the combined artificially propagated 
and naturally produced components of populations (NMFS 2004a, 2005a). 
The proposal raises interesting policy and science questions. The policy side 
must address the acceptable degree of risk, both with respect to biological issues 
(such as likelihood of persistence) and management issues (such as the likeli-
hood of continued funding for artificial propagation programs). On the science 
side, biologists must incorporate artificial propagation into extinction risk 
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models despite poor data on breeding patterns, reproductive success, and move_ 
ment of hatchery and wild fish. At the interface berween science and policy, 
there is the question of the importance of a species' "evolutionary trajectory." Is 
a distinct population segment in danger of diverging from a natural evolution_ 
ary trajectory because of artificial selection also "in danger of extinction? Pre-
sumably it could be if the artificial selection makes it likely the distinct popula-
tion segment will no longer be significant to the taxon (or evolutionarily 
significant, in the case of an evolutionarily significant unit; Myers et al. 2004). 
PUBLIC AND COURT REACTION 
Courts are generally unwilling to second-guess agency biologists when it comes 
to taxonomic classification or evaluation of extinction risk. The General Ac-
counting Office reviewed sixty-four listing decisions by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service berween 1999 and 2002 and found that peer reviewers "over-
whelmingly supported" the science behind the decisions. Courts overturned 
only rwo listing decisions because of improper use of scientific data (GAO 
2003). However, courts will intervene when judges believe the National Marine 
Fisheries Service or U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have failed to follow the 
statute, regulations, or policies, or when the judge believes the agencies have 
failed to adequately explain the connection berween the data and the conclu-
sion. For example, a district court invalidated NMFS's decision to list naturally 
spawned but not hatchery-spawned Oregon coast coho salmon, even though 
the agency found them to comprise a single evolutionarily significant unit 
(Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans 2001). A court of appeals threw out the USFWS's 
decision to list a population of the cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl (Glaucidium 
brasilianum cactorum) because the agency failed to explain how the population 
was "significant" and therefore a distinct population segment under the joint 
DPS policy (National Association of Home Builders v. Norton 2003). And a dis-
trict court concluded that NMFS did not use the best available science when it 
relied on an outdated taxonomic classification for the killer whale ( Orcinus orca) 
( Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn 2003). 
ADVANCING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE 
The NRC review of use of science in the Endangered Species Act was support-
ive of the "evolutionary unit" concept (National Research Council 1995). 
Much of the ongoing scientific debate over DPS/ESU identification involves 
technical points, such as how best to describe evolutionarily significant varia-
tion for protection (summarized in Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b; Waples, this vol-
ume). Some observers feel the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service have defined distinct population segments too narrowly 
(Doremus 1997), arguing that the Endangered Species Act was intended to pro-
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tect populations that have aesthetic value, are keystone species within their 
ecosystems, or are in some other sense unique. The concern is that the rigid "sci-
entific" approach embodied in ESU and DPS policies ignores other equally 
valid values that Congress intended to protect. The policies in most cases pro-
vide workable guidance in determining whether a species exists for purposes of 
the act. 
Extinction Risk 
Once the listable unit (i.e., species, subspecies, or distinct population segment) 
is identified, its risk of extinction must be estimated under section 4(a) of the 
Endangered Species Act (table 10.1). The act defines an "endangered species" to 
be "in danger of extinction throughout all or a signficant portion of its range" 
(sec. 3(6)) and a "threatened species" to be "likely to become an endangered 
species within the foreseeable future" (sec. 3(19)). 
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN AGENCY PRACTICE 
Risk evaluations are necessarily a combination of scientific analyses and policy 
judgments about the degree of "acceptable" risk and the time frames over which 
risk should be evaluated (Burgman 2005). Decision makers must then interject 
a judgment about whether a species' risk of extinction triggers the statutory def-
initions of "endangered" or "threatened." 
Qualitative approaches to estimating species risk, if transparent and system-
atic, can be as reliable as quantitative approaches (e.g., Keith et ai. 2004; Mc-
Carthy et ai. 2004). Neither the u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service nor the National 
Marine Fisheries Service regularly use widely accepted qualitative approaches to 
estimating extinction risk OUCN 1994; NatureServe 2003). NMFS imple-
mented its own risk evaluation matrix to assess the status of over fifty ESUs of 
Pacific salmonids (Wainwright and Kope 1999). This matrix accounted for di-
versity and spatial distribution in addition to conventional population status 
analysis (e.g., Allendorf et ai. 1997; Shelden et ai. 2001). 
Quantitative extinction risk models (known collectively as population via-
bility analyses, or PYAs) require information on population size, population 
growth rate, and variability in population growth rate over time (Dennis et ai. 
1991; Boyce 1992; Morris et ai. 1999). The critical first step of identifying de-
mographically independent populations is almost never done in PYAs despite 
evidence that ignoring population structure can cause grave errors in estimates 
of extinction risk (Morris et ai. 1999). In a recent counterexample, NMFS iden-
tified independent populations before conducting viability modeling for Pacific 
salmonids (McElhany et ai. 2000; Ruckelshaus et ai. 2002a). 
The data needed to parameterize even the simplest PYA models are almost 
always incomplete (Reed et aI., this volume). Additional uncertainties arise with 
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TABLE IO.I Key science-related provisions within the Endangered Species Act 
ESA provision 
4(a) Listing 
4(a) Listing 
Science-related 
question addressed 
by provision 
Is there a "species"? 
What is the species' 
risk of extinction? 
Further work 
needed on analyses 
pertaining to 
provision 
Improved definition 
of the "distinct 
population seg-
ment! evol utionarily 
significant unit" 
concept 
Improved definition 
of time scales, at-
tention to multiple 
indicators of risk, 
methods of estimat-
ing rates of repro-
duction of at-risk 
speCles 
4(b) Critical habitat What habitat features Relationship berween 
habitat quality! 
quantityand 
species extinction 
risk 
designation 
7(a)(2) Federal 
consultation 
lO(a)(l)(B) Habitat 
conservation 
plans 
4(f) Recovery 
planning 
are essential to 
species' conserva-
tion and how much 
habitat is needed 
for conservation? 
What effect will a par-
ticular action have 
on species' survival 
or recovery? 
Does an action result 
in take, and if so, 
how much?* 
Relative importance 
of different limiting 
factors in extinction 
risk; how effects of 
individual actions 
relate to whole pop-
ulation! species 
impacts 
What are the charac- All of the above 
teristics of a recov-
ered species? 
What factors are lim-
iting recovery? 
What habitat is essen-
tial to recovery? 
---------
Further work 
needed On 
application oj 
provision 
---------------
Agency guidance On 
how to address h 
bridization, defi~: 
tion of taxonomie 
"significance," and 
artificially propa_ 
gated individuals 
Agency guidance on 
consideration of el(. 
tinction risk and 
"significant portion" 
of range 
Agency guidance on 
designating critical 
habitat, how to 
weigh benefits!costs; 
consider sequence of 
application 
More-open science 
process in section 7 
consultations; guid-
ance on considering 
piecemeal vs. whole 
life-cyde approach 
More public participa-
tion in policy over-
sight of the planning 
process 
* This question also arises in section 9 enforcement actions, which are not addressed in this chapter. 
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model structure-for example, how to depict population responses at small 
sizes, the effects of density-dependent population regulation, and choice of a 
quasi-extinction threshold (Morris et al. 1999). For these reasons it is important 
[0 explore the sensitivity ofPVA results to alternative assumptions (e.g., Dennis 
et at. 1991; Holmes 2001; Holmes and Fagan 2002), as NMFS has done for 
estimating the status of Pacific salmon and Steller sea-lions (Eumetopias juba-
tUll in listing and recovery decisions (Gerber and VanBlaricom 2001; NMFS 
2003a; Puget Sound Technical Recovery Team 2002; Willamette-Lower Co-
lumbia Technical Recovery Team 2003). 
Applications of PVA generally assume that past trends and variability in in-
put parameters can be used to project future population dynamics. This is al-
most certainly an incorrect assumption given climate change, changes in hu-
man management of the landscape, introduction and spread of nonindigenous 
species, and changing rates and intensity of human-influenced catastrophes 
(e.g., fire, toxic, or oil spills). A promising approach is to use scenario planning 
whereby scientists ask whether an estimated risk of extinction (or any popula-
tion outcome) changes under alternative views of future conditions (see "The 
Science Underlying Recovery Planning" in this chapter; Clark et al. 2001; Car-
penter 2002; Peterson et al. 2003). 
An emerging issue for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service is interpretation of the statutory definition of an endan-
gered species as one that is in danger of extinction "throughout all or a signifi-
cant portion of its range" (emphasis added). Recent practice has been to rely on 
the identification of a distinct population segment. Dissatisfied with some de-
terminations not to list, plaintiffs have begun ro challenge the agencies for fail-
ure to separately examine whether a species, subspecies, or DPS is in danger of 
extinction in at least a portion of its range (Deftnders of Wildlife v. Norton 2001, 
2002; Environmental Protection Information Center [EPIC) v. National Marine 
Fisheries Service [NMFS} 2004.) While the two agencies have not yet explicitly 
interpreted this statutory phrase, recent USFWS decisions have applied a bio-
logical test, similar to the significance test of the DPS policy, examining 
whether a population group is biologically significant even though it is not dis-
crete (e.g., USFWS 1998,2000). It is unclear whether the two agencies believe 
that a species in danger of extinction in only a portion of its range must be listed 
throughout its entire range (see Marbled Murrelet v. Lujan 1992). 
PUBLIC AND COURT REACTION 
Doremus (1997) suggested that the public reacts negatively to unbridled agency 
discretion in identifying species and determining risk of extinction. However, 
it seems this reaction is less about whether the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
and National Marine Fisheries Service have misapplied science than it is an 
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objection to protecting such creatures as rats and bugs, often against private in-
terests. Courts tend to defer to agency listing determinations (GAO 2003), ex-
cept when they conclude that the agencies failed to follow the statute or agency 
regulations. Although public comment on listing proposals often contests the 
agencies' analysis of extinction risk, the authors are unaware of any Successful 
court challenges in that area. 
ADVANCING THE ROLE OF SCIENCE 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service re-
cently outlined criteria by which they will evaluate the effects of federal, state, 
and local conservation efforts when making listing decisions (USFWS and 
NMFS 2003b). These so-called "conservation measures" have been or soon will 
be implemented, although it is still too soon to evaluate their effects on extinc-
tion risk. The question is a scientific one that can be exceedingly challenging to 
address (see discussion in "The Science Underlying Recovery Planning" below). 
The two agencies would be well served by adopting recommendations ac-
knowledging that making listing determinations is not just a science exercise 
but has three important policy components: (1) the time period over which per-
sistence should be measured, (2) the level of risk that results in a threatened or 
endangered finding, and (3) the burden of proof for demonstrating the effects 
of conservation measures. Such recommendations must be flexible enough to 
account for the inaccuracy of extinction risk estimates and for biological differ-
ences among species. For example, the time period over which extinction is 
considered may depend upon the inherent variability in demographic charac-
teristics of a species or the ability of scientists to forecast long-term trends. Rec-
ommendations would need to leave room for decision makers and scientists to 
work together to understand the biological implications of alternative risk levels 
(e.g., modelers can illuminate for decision makers what a 0.99, 0.95, or 0.80 
probability of extinction looks like) (Doremus, this volume). 
Research is needed on how best to make population or species demographic 
parameter estimates from spotty census information (Reed et aI., this volume). 
Abundance information for many species of conservation concern consists of 
presence/absence data, index counts, or censuses during a specific life stage that 
are easy to count, such as breeding aggregations. Making a determination about 
the viability status of a species requires that these sample data be translated into 
whole population or species counts. What are the best methods for making that 
translation? What are the advantages and pitfalls associated with different ap-
proaches to estimating species numbers from population subsamples? 
Finally, accounting for environmental factors and species interactions that 
accelerate or mitigate downward population trends could significantly improve 
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quantitative models of extinction risk (see also "The Science Underlying Recov-
ery Planning" below; National Research Council 1995). 
The Science Underlying Critical Habitat Designations 
Within one year oflisting, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Ma-
rine Fisheries Service must designate critical habitat to the maximum extent 
prudent and determinable (table 10.1). The Endangered Species Act defines 
critical habitat as "the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by 
the species ... on which are found those physical or biological features ... es-
sential to the conservation of the species," and "specific areas outside the geo-
graphical area occupied by the species ... upon a determination by the Secre-
tary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species" (USFWS 
and NMFS 199ge, 31872). From this construction, the statute seems to con-
template an approach to critical habitat designation that favors occupied areas: 
the agencies first identifY habitat elements essential to species conservation (for 
example, a particular type of tree for nesting, vegetation for forage or cover, 
gravel streambeds for spawning, etc.) and then designate areas within the 
species' present range where those elements are present. Only for areas outside 
the species' present range must there be a determination that the area itself is 
"essential for conservation." In practice, the agencies, plaintiffs, and some 
courts have blurred the two standards and require that all areas, occupied or 
unoccupied, meet the test for unoccupied habitat: the area itself must be essen-
tial for conservation. For example, in a case involving the Rio Grande silvery 
minnow (Hybognathus amarus), the court stated that critical habitat "must be 
limited geographically to what is essential to the conservation of the threatened 
or endangered species" (Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District v. Babbitt 
2000). And in a case involving the Alameda whipsnake (Masticophis lateralis eu-
ryxanthus) the court observed that "critical habitat for occupied land is defined 
in part ... as specific areas 'essential to the conservation of the species'" (Home 
Builders Association of Northern California v. US. Fish and Wildlifi Service 
2003). 
The USFWS and NMFS have long maintained that critical habitat designa-
tion adds little to species protection (Clark 1999). Section 7 of the ESA requires 
federal agencies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize species' continued 
existence and do not destroy or adversely modifY their critical habitat. The two 
agencies have usually treated an action that adversely modifies critical habitat as 
also jeopardizing the species' continued existence, making the prohibition 
against adverse modification redundant. Agency regulations defining both jeop-
ardy and adverse modification in similar terms (actions affecting "both the 
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survival and recovery" of the species) have reinforced this approach. Critics 
point out that critical habitat designation is especially important for species 
protection in unoccupied habitat, where the USFWS and NMFS may be less 
likely to reach a jeopardy finding (Taylor et al. 2003, 2005). Two separate reviews 
examined effects of critical habitat designations on reported trends in species 
abundance and content of recovery plans, and the results were mixed (Clark et al. 
2002; Hoekstra et al. 2002b; Taylor et al. 2003, 2005). Recent court decisions 
have invalidated the agencies' regulatory definition of adverse modification as 
not being sufficiently tied to conservation (Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. 
Fish and Wildlifi Service 2004; Sierra Club v. us. Fish and Wildlifi Service 
2001). As future section 7 practice adjusts to the new legal rulings, the two tests 
may prove not to be redundant and the designation of critical habitat may in-
deed provide increased protection for listed species. The authors believe the cur-
rent landscape is too unsettled to draw a reliable conclusion from past practice. 
Critical habitat designations, where they have been made, have lacked 
meaningful analysis of the economic impact (see New Mexico Cattle Growers As-
sociation v. US. Fish and Wildlifi Service 2001). Successful court challenges to 
designations (or lack of designations) have led to multiple requirements for the 
USFWS to designate habitat in very short time frames. Moreover, courts have 
ordered the agencies to consider economic impacts of designation, even if they 
are "coextensive" with the impacts of applying the section 7 jeopardy require-
ment (New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. US. Fish and Wildlifi Service 
2001). This requirement is contrary to the best available science regarding eco-
nomic analysis, which would require an estimate of the costs of designation 
based on a comparison of the world with and without the designation (Office of 
Management and Budget 2003). 
In response, the u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has vigorously objected to 
the requirement (e.g., testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Interior Craig 
Manson, [Manson 2003]). Past congressional efforts have failed to amend the 
ESA to change the timing of critical habitat designation to coincide with recov-
ery planning instead of listing, but it remains a topic of congressional interest. 
The Role of Science in Agency Practice 
Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act requires critical habitat desig-
nation to be based on the best scientific data available, although the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service may exclude areas 
from designation if economic or other relevant impacts outweigh the benefits 
of designation. However, often agencies know little about species' habitat 
needs at the time of listing and thus identification of critical habitat is highly 
uncertain. 
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The agenCIes Jomt designation of critical habitat for the Gulf sturgeon 
(Actpenser oxyrinchus desotoi) illustrates this. The two agencies examined the 
population structure and concluded that the seven extant populations were 
largely reproductively isolated. They reasoned that the populations at the ex-
tremes of the range are important for conserving genetic diversity and that the 
intermediate populations are important for connectivity, and concluded that all 
habitat currently occupied by the seven populations is essential for conservation 
(USFWS 2003i). Like the judgments made in analyzing extinction risk, these 
were clearly not made in a policy vacuum. The question of how many popula-
tions are needed for conservation and how much habitat each needs for conser-
vation are not just scientific questions. The answers depend upon tolerance to 
risk and time scales over which the risk is considered. 
One of the more contentious debates surrounding critical habitat designa-
tion concerns the consideration of economic costs of designation by the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service and their dis-
cretion under section 4(b)(2) of the ESA to exclude areas from designation if 
the benefit of exclusion outweighs the benefit of designation. The two agencies 
have only recently begun to apply economic analysis in their designations, and 
their use of the science of economics is not well developed. Their past practice 
of collapsing the jeopardy and adverse modification requirements into a single 
test has complicated the economic analysis. Furthermore, at the time of listing, 
information is lacking on land use patterns and how economic activities would 
be modified as a result of section 7 consultations. 
Public and Court Reaction 
Provisions in the Endangered Species Act for critical habitat designations have 
proven a major flash point for both advocates and critics of species protection 
(e.g., Sacramento Bee 2003b; Wilson 2003b; Cart and Weiss 2004). For advo-
cates, the provisions give them their strongest tool for protecting habitat. For 
critics, the provisions are among the few places in the statute where economics 
comes into play, making them a rallying point for the development-regulated 
community. Further, many landowners assume that when private land is desig-
nated as critical habitat the federal government is in effect "taking" their prop-
erty and will restrict its use. And, finally, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service, arguing that critical habitat designation 
adds nothing to species protection, have resisted designating habitat altogether 
or have simply designated habitat without sufficient analysis (Patlis 2001). It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the agencies often fail to make critical habitat des-
ignations and when they do, the designations frequently end up in court (GAO 
2003). 
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The courts have responded to such treatment with impatience, chastising 
agency reluctance to designate critical habitat and ordering that designations be 
completed expeditiously. Further complicating the situation are court decisions 
finding the agencies' regulatory definition of adverse modification invalid. The 
lack of guidance by the two agencies and a growing number of court opinions 
make the situation still more uncertain. 
Advancing the Role o/Science 
There are promising biological approaches that could be used to at least par-
tially address the question of how much occupied and unoccupied habitat is 
needed for species persistence (Hanski 1999), but the data requirements are 
daunting. For instance, population matrix models can be used to address the 
question of how changes in survival at particular life stages affect overall popu-
lation dynamics or persistence (Caswell 2001). One example of such an appli-
cation with a listed species is the endangered Kemp's ridley sea turtle (Lepi-
dochelys kempii), in which matrix models suggest that the survival of subadults 
and adults in the ocean was most critical to overall population status (Heppell et 
al. 1996; Heppell and Crowder 1998). Another approach is to predict how 
changes in habitat will impact species status based on empirical habitat suitabil-
ity models (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2003). Unfortunately, we have limited ability to 
directly address the question of critical habitat-what habitat conditions or 
amounts significantly affect life-stage-specific survivals? 
The science of economics also could contribute to improving the designa-
tion process. Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act requires the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service to consider the 
impacts of designation and balance the benefits of exclusion against the benefits 
of designation. Federal guidelines recommend putting the two types of benefits 
into the same metric in a cost-benefit framework (Office of Management and 
Budget 2003). Although information may be readily available that allows eco-
nomic impacts to be quantified and monetized, quantifYing the benefits to 
species from critical habitat designation is more difficult. 
Thus, best economics practice would have the agencies measure the incre-
mental impact and benefit of designation; the courts, however, have ruled oth-
erwise (New Mexico Cattle Growers Association v. US. Fish and Wildlife Service 
2001). How should the agencies proceed in this situation? Best economic prac-
tice would have them conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis, yet the short statu-
tory time frames, limited information and resources, and considerable latitude 
for discretion suggest formal cost-benefit analysis may be neither possible nor 
necessary. One observer has suggested that approaches other than cost-benefit 
analysis, such as a cost-effectiveness framework, may be more appropriate (Sin-
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den 2004). This recommendation is consistent with Office of Budget and Man-
agement guidance in cases where benefits are difficult to monetize (such as ben-
efits to health or the environment). 
The National Research Council recommended identification of habitat crit-
ical to survival at time oflisting and designating the rest of critical habitat at the 
time of recovery planning (National Research Council 1995). These changes 
would require legislative reform of the act, but tying critical habitat designation 
to recovery planning has many proponents. The Department of the Interior has 
gone on record supporting such a connection (Manson 2004). The General Ac-
counting Office recommends that the USFWS and NMFS adopt guidance on 
critical habitat designation (GAO 2003). 
Until the agencies amend the regulatory definition of adverse modification, 
it will be unclear what standard they are applying in their section 7 consulta-
tions and whether they continue to view the prohibitions against jeopardy and 
adverse modification of critical habitat as providing redundant protection. 
Guidance on the economic analysis called for in the act would also help the 
USFWS and NMFS expedite designations. In particular, criteria for determin-
ing whether consideration of economic or other relevant impacts outweigh the 
benefits of designation would be helpful. 
The Science Underlying Limitations on Federal Actions 
When a federal agency intends an action that may affect a listed species, it 
must consult with the listing agency (table 10.1). For actions that adversely af-
fect the species, the agency provides its biological opinion as to whether the ac-
tion as proposed is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed 
species or adversely modifY its critical habitat. If the agency's opinion is that 
the action is likely to cause jeopardy or adverse modification, it must offer a 
reasonable and prudent alternative. The statute requires that all agencies "shall 
use the best scientific and commercial data available" in fulfilling the consulta-
tion requirement. 
Analysis of jeopardy and adverse modification is one of the most common 
tasks required of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fish-
eries Service yet one in which the standards are most obscure (Rohlf 1989, 
2001). The statute does not define jeopardy or adverse modification. The two 
agencies have adopted regulatory definitions of these terms (USFWS and 
NMFS 199ge), but their consultation handbook lays out an analytical ap-
proach that does not track the regulatory definitions. The regulations define 
"jeopardize the continued existence of" to mean "to engage in an action that 
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the 
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by 
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reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species" (USFWS 
and NMFS 199ge, 31872). Adverse modification is defined as an alteration 
that "appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival 
and recovery of a listed species." By these definitions the agencies need to com-
pare the likelihood of a species survival and recovery with and without the pro-
posed action to establish jeopardy, and to compare the value of critical habitat 
with and without the proposed action to establish adverse modification. 
In practice, however, the agencies seldom take that approach, and their con-
sultation handbook lays out a different chain oflogic. The handbook directs the 
agencies to consider the status of the species, the environmental baseline, the ef-
fects of the action, and cumulative effects to determine whether the species is 
likely to survive and recover (USFWS and NMFS 199ge). It does not say what 
the agencies should do after summing up those factors. If the species is not ex-
pected to survive and recover, how much must the action under consultation 
contribute to that failure before it is considered jeopardy? Or, less likely, if the 
species is expected to survive and recover, does it matter how much modifica-
tion occurs to the species' remaining habitat? Analysis of adverse modification 
of critical habitat is further complicated by two circuit courts invalidating the 
regulatory definition, as discussed previously. 
In addition to offering opinions on jeopardy and adverse modification, the 
USFWS and NMFS must issue an incidental take statement authorizing a given 
level of take associated with the proposed action. Where the action involves 
habitat modification (for example, a grazing allotment), the agencies must de-
termine what level of take will be associated with the habitat modification. Al-
though such a determination must be made based on scientific analyses, it is 
very difficult for scientists to quantifY a species' response to habitat alterations, 
especially smaller-scale changes in habitat. 
This is an area in particular where science is inadequate to answer the ques-
tions asked. Agencies often lack information to predict the effect an action is 
likely to have on a listed species. Furthermore, risks are generally cumulative 
and assessing the effect of each individual action on species status is exceedingly 
difficult. Finally, threats come from many different actions in different sectors, 
forcing the agencies to make a choice about how much of the conservation bur-
den should fall on a given sector (box 10.1). 
The Role of Science in Agency Practice 
The variety of agency action considered in section 7 consultations is extremely 
diverse, as are the species affected. We offer a few examples in box 10.1 to draw 
lessons from agency practice. 
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BOX 10.1 Exampies demonstrating the role of science in impIe-
menting section 7 Iimitations on federal actions under the En-
dangered Species Act 
Example 1: Addressing Scientific Uncertainty 
The manner in wh ich inevitable scientific uncertainty is incorporated into section 7 
consultations is key to using seience to inform sound decisions. In the high-profile 
case of Bureau of Reclamation operations on the Klamath River Basin water man-
agement project, the National Research Council was brought in to help resolve 
what many characterized as a scientinc dispute (Cooperman and Markle 2003). 
The NRC's final report (National Research Council 2004a) highlights several rec-
ommendations aimed at reducing the uncertainty in the biological conclusions by 
the the two agencies that the Bureau's proposed actions will not jeopardize the listed 
species. Recommendations include the following: (1) the V.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service are urged to complete recovery 
plans for the two species that should identify how research and monitoring will sup-
port species recovery and facilitate identification of what actions are allowed under 
section 7 and 10 consultations, (2) scientists should be allowed sufficient time to 
publish key research findings in peer-reviewed scientific journals, (3) a diverse team 
of "cooperators" should be convened for designing ecosystem-based management 
actions that have local support for implementation, and (4) experiments should be 
conducted to test the effectiveness and feasibility of speeific remediation strategies 
(National Research Council2002b, 2004a). 
In another example, NMFS was thwarted in an attempt to deal with uncertain-
ties associated with future allocation of necessary conservation actions among sec-
tors in the Columbia River Basin, home to twelve species of endangered salmon and 
steelhead whose migrations are affected by operation of the power system. In 2000, 
NMFS issued a biological opinion on operation of the Federal Columbia River 
Power System (NMFS 2000a). Ta explain how it allocated the conservation burden, 
NMFS and the other federal agencies involved presented a conceptual recovery plan 
(NMFS 2000b) describing the necessary assumptions about continued harvest re-
strictions into the future if the sum of impacts on listed fish was to avoid jeopardy. 
This opinion was invalidated by a district court finding that the agency improperly 
relied on assumed future actions that were not "reasonably certain to occur" (Na-
tional Wildlife Federation v. NMFS 2003), leaving in question the ability of the 
agencies to consider the "big picture" when section 7 biological opinions have im-
plications for allocation of take. 
Example 2: Considering Actions in Isolation 
For many species it is the cumulative effect of many actions that have led to their 
imperilment and it is difncult far the Services in a section 7 consultation to make 
the case that a single small action, when added to the many other small actions, 
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jeopardizes the species' continued existence. In the case of water withdrawals from 
the Columbia River, NMFS did issue a jeopardy opinion to the Corps of Engineers 
on the basis that Columbia River fl.ows were already below species' needs in many 
years, the cumulative impact of withdrawals contributed to those low fl.ows, and 
there was no mechanism in place to limit future withdrawals. Even though the 
withdrawal under consideration was very small compared to overall fl.ows in the 
Columbia, NMFS concluded the proposed action would jeopardize Columbia 
River salmon and steelhead because of the cumulative effect of past and future with-
drawals (NMFS 1998). This decision stirred considerable controversy in the Basin, 
leading Washington's Department of Ecology to appeal to the NRC, asking the 
NRC to review the science supporting fl.ow levels in the Columbia. Although the 
question put to the panel was framed in terms of the incremental risk posed by a 
very small incremental degradation in fl.ows, the panel resisted being drawn into an-
swering the narrow question. In its preliminary findings, the panel appears to sup-
port the analysis that because fl.ows currendyare inadequate, even small increases in 
water withdrawals will increase risk (National Research Council2004c). 
Advancing the Rote ofScience 
The agencies need to provide dear guidance regarding general standards for 
jeopardy and adverse modification. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service could also provide dearer guidance on individ-
ual species, for example on identifYing critically low population levels, viable 
population levels, and allowable levels of take. Standards should allow for scien-
tific information to be taken into account along with the policy considerations. 
AB with all seetions of the act, a life-cyde framework for estimating the po-
tential effects of an action on species status would appear to be the best way to 
adequately address the question posed in seetion 7. Whether that life-cyde 
framework is quantitative or qualitative is less important than adopting a life-
cyde perspective. In general, because of the inherent scientific uncertainty in es-
timating the biological consequences of numerous, small-scale actions, section 
7 consultations should be treated as experiments that are monitored and ad-
justed as needed over time (see box 10.1). 
The Science Underlying Limitations on Private Actions 
The Endangered Species Act prohibits any person from taking a member of a 
listed species (sec. (a)(1)(B); box 10.1). Take is defined broadly to indude harm, 
and harm can indude destruction of habitat to the extent it actually injures or 
kills individual animals. Science comes into play when a party seeks an excep-
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rion ro the take prohibition under section 10 (habitat conservation plans, or 
Hers) or section 4(d). Regardless of the legal avenue, the standard is similar-
the proposed take cannot result in jeopardy to the species' continued existence 
or the destruction or adverse modification of its habitat. 
The Role o/Science in Agency Practice 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service face 
the same challenges in permitting take that they face in consultations with fed-
eral agencies. However, consultations between federal agencies are relatively fluid 
and can be reinitiated when circumstances change or new information becomes 
available. Private parties, on the other hand, often seek a long-term commitment 
from the two agencies. In an effort to encourage more landowners to protect en-
dangered species, the USFWS and NMFS adopted a series of policies offering as-
surances that agreements with the federal government would be lasting, for ex-
ample through the "No Surprises" rule (USFWS and NMFS 1998) and safe 
harbor agreements (USFWS 1999f, 1999g, 2001, 2003h; Bean et al. 2001). 
Advancing the Role o/Science 
The opportunities for improving the use of science under sections 10 or 4(d) 
are similar to those under section 7-that is, if the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice and National Marine Fisheries Service encourage transparent evaluation of 
the cumulative effects of actions, in light of the overall effect of other actions 
throughout a species' life cycle, better decisions under these sections of the act 
should result. 
Under sections 7 and 10 (and also under section 4(f), recovery planning, 
discussed below) three key ecological relationships must be established: (1) 
landscape-level processes that drive environmental factors imperiling a species, 
(2) relationships between critical environmental factors and species status, and 
(3) effects of actions that can directly or indirectly affect species status. To es-
tablish these relationships with certainty will require years of scientific study. 
Meanwhile, identifYing data or information critical to such estimates will im-
prove current decision making (e.g., Burgman 2005). Scientifically designed 
monitoring and adaptive management of habitat conservation plans is also de-
sirable but currently absent from most (Kareiva et a1. 1998). 
The Science Underlying Recovery Planning 
The Endangered Species Act requires the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and 
National Marine Fisheries Service to adopt recovery plans for listed species 
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(table 10.1) but does not specify a time frame within which plans must be com-
pleted. A recovery plan is expected to describe the biological conditions neces-
sary for recovery of the species, or the state under which the species can be 
delisted. Recovery plans do not have any regulatory effect, but they can be used 
to coordinate and guide the agencies' decision making in section 7 and 10 con-
sultations or in issuing take permits across a species' range. The act has minimal 
requirements for recovery plans: they must specify objective, measurable criteria 
for delisting, specific actions that will achieve those objectives, and an estimate 
of the time and cost involved in completing the actions. 
The Role o/Science in Agency Practice 
Science has a clear role in determining the objective, measurable criteria that 
will lead to delisting. It should also be used to identify factors limiting recovery 
and determine the biological consequences of site-specific management actions 
aimed at recovering the species. 
The National Marine Fisheries Service provides a general recovery planning 
document that outlines principles for plan development and content (NMFS 
1992). Subsequently, NMFS wrote a document providing additional guidance 
on specific technical issues concerning recovery planning for the rwenty-six 
listed ESUs of Pacific salmon (McElhany et al. 2000; Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b). 
It addresses several fundamental questions, including (1) What was the histori-
cal population structure of an ESU? (2) What are the characteristics of a viable 
population for each of the historically independent populations in an ESU? (3) 
What are possible configurations (which might differ from historical condi-
tions) of the spatial distribution, risk status, and diversity characteristics of pop-
ulations across a viable ESU? and (4) What actions are needed for recovery of an 
ESU? Answers to questions 2 and 3 provide viability criteria for populations 
and ESUs, and analyses underlying question 4 allow for evaluation of alterna-
tive actions and their predicted effects on population and ESU status. 
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service approaches recovery planning differently 
than the National Marine Fisheries Service. Rather than establishing species-
based viability criteria and identifying which actions can achieve those criteria, 
the USFWS focuses technical analyses in recovery planning on threats to species 
viability and the actions needed to alleviate them. Most plans describe recovery 
criteria in qualitative rather than quantitative terms, although listed species 
whose recovery plans contained quantitative criteria were more likely to be im-
proving (Gerber and Hatch 2002). 
Because of the complexity of predicting cumulative effects of any recovery 
actions, the National Marine Fisheries Service is incorporating scenario plan-
ning into its estimates of the likely effects of habitat, hatchery, and harvest man-
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agement actions on the population status of listed salmon (Ruckelshaus et al. 
2002b). Land- and water-use scenarios are being elicited from watershed coun-
cils in addition to climate projections, providing greater confidence in the pro-
posed recovery plan. 
Advancing the Role of Science 
The science underpinning recovery plans and their implementation needs im-
provement (Clark et al. 2002). Given the current state of knowledge, science is 
best used to evaluate the relative merits of alternative actions rather than to pro-
vide "the answer." Collaboration with policy and planning staff who will influ-
ence implementation of actions is important (Rinkevich and Leon 2000; Won-
dolleck and Yaffee 2000; Brick et al. 2001; Yaffee 2006). Given the uncertainty 
of recovery efforts, management actions should be treated as experiments that 
are monitored with vigilance (Boersma et al. 2001; Crouse et al. 2002). 
The need for more basic natural history information for informing decisions 
under the ESA cannot be overstated. What constitutes a reproductively isolated 
group of individuals for a given species? In which habitats does a species occur 
throughout its life cycle, and what are its survival rates in alLernative habitat 
types? What is the relative reproductive success of pairings between alternative 
life history types (table 10.I)? 
Conservation scientists have called for greater attention to multispecies and 
ecosystem effects in recovery plans (USFWS and NMFS 1994b; Miller 1996). 
The potential importance of such community and ecosystem-level effects to 
species recovery is great, as illustrated by north Pacific whaling effects on sea ot-
ters in Alaska (Springer et al. 2003), ecological functions provided by grizzly 
bears (Pyare and Berger 2003), and predation by Caspian terns (Sterna caspia) 
on juvenile salmon in the Columbia River (Roby et al. 2003). How to incorpo-
rate community- or ecosystem-level effects in a recovery plan is not clear, and 
Clark et al. (2002) caution that multispecies plans may in fact reduce the focus 
on individual species to the detriment of their conservation status. 
Finally, clearer agency guidance on what constitutes "acceptable" risk would 
improve recovery planning, as would clearer explanation of how uncertainty in 
biological conclusions is accounted for in decisions and whether there are dif-
ferences between jeopardy and recovery standards. 
How Can Scientists Improve ESA implementation? 
The contributions of academic and agency science to ESA implementation have 
been unevenly distributed among topical areas. Quantitative analyses to iden-
tify units for conservation and to estimate species viability (or, conversely, risk 
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of extinction) have received the lion's share of attention in the scientific litera_ 
ture (fig. 10.1). These methods are not without controversy but are relatively 
well tested and many of their limitations have been discussed (Waples, this vol-
urne; Boyce 1992; Akpkaya et al. 1999; Coulson et al. 2001; Brook et al. 2000, 
2002; Ellner and Fieburg 2003). Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, such 
quantitative approaches are useful for only a small fraction of rare, threatened 
, 
or endangered species. 
The science of characterizing degrees of imperilment using qualitative ap-
proaches also has improved since 1973 (e.g., IUCN 1994; Ak«akaya et al. 2000; 
NatureServe 2003), and greater attention to these methods would be helpful in 
ESA decisions for a majority of rhe species considered (Keith et al. 2004; Mc-
Carthy er al. 2004). 
Analytical methods to address the remaining questions asked in the ESA im-
plementation process have barely emerged in the scientific literature (fig. 10.1). 
In particular, the science underlying identification of the effects of actions on 
species status lags far behind. Such analyses are needed to address questions un-
der sections 7 and 10 (i.e., do these actions significantly reduce the species' like-
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lihood of survival and recovery?), section 4(b) (i.e., what habitat quantities and 
qualities are necessary for the survival and recovery of the species?), and section 
4(f) (i.e., what actions are sufficient to achieve species viability criteria?). The 
needed research is challenging, time consuming, and difficult to generalize 
across species and locations. Especially lacking are empirical or analytical stud-
ies of the effects of specific actions on particular life stages and population 
dynamics. 
Communication between scientists and decision makers is critical. Simple 
in concept, interaction between the groups is complicated in practice by the dif-
ferent worlds they inhabit-scientists can say "I don't know" and acknowledge 
that some scientific questions require years to answer, while decision makers 
must act within the limited time frames mandated by the Endangered Species 
Act, often on the basis of incomplete information. This can lead to frustration 
on both sides. We believe that the effort to communicate is well worth the trials 
involved (Ruckelshaus et al. 2002b). Previous studies have highlighted the need 
for help from conservation scientists that allows decision makers to more effec-
tively link basic biology or ecology to management decisions (Floyd 2001; 
Clark et al. 2002). Approaches such as those developed under decision theory 
(Clemen 1996; Burgman 2005) and multicriteria mapping (Arrow and Ray-
naud 1986; Bana e Costa 1990) are potentially useful, but we found no exam-
ples applying these tools in decision making under the Endangered Species Act. 
Science can have a significant impact on decisions made under the ESA as 
long as it isn't relied upon to be the sole arbiter in decisions (Doremus 1997; see 
Yaffee 2006). Scientists need to clearly explain to decision makers how science 
can (and cannot) inform their choices. Scientists and decision makers should be 
willing to participate in public forums where data, analytical approaches, and 
assumptions can be openly discussed. It is a rare manager of endangered species 
who will communicate through forums to which scientists are accustomed, 
such as the published literature (e.g., Rosenberg 2002). If scientists are free to 
interact with policy- and decision makers in processes designed to encourage 
open exchange, the result will be a clearer understanding of the need for an ap-
propriate role of science in solving species protection challenges. 
It is critical that discussions between scientists and policy makers and those 
involving the public clearly state the scientific basis for a result and any addi-
tional policy determinations brought to bear in making a decision under the 
act. To improve scientific credibility and agency decision making, scientists and 
decision makers must clearly distinguish between facts and assumptions and 
how each drives the results. If they fail to do so, laypersons will challenge the 
facts, rather than question the assumptions. 
Because the act poses biological questions that almost always must be an-
swered with imperfect information, scientists should encourage implementation 
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of alternative actions as experiments. Furthermore, carefully estimating what We 
can learn from experiments before launching into controversial sets of actions is 
well worth the effort (e.g., Paulsen and Hinrichsen 2002), as is carefully moni-
toring the results. In the end, to enhance protection of species under the Endan-
gered Species Act, biologists must get involved. Such involvement is not without 
potential costs (e.g., Halpern and Wilson 2003), but conducting sound research 
is not enough to protect a species if the results from a beautiful biological study 
sit in a journal, unread. 
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